Image credit: © Kim Klement-USA TODAY Sports
Translated by Marco Gámez
Two weeks into each new season is, for a variety of reasons, my least favorite time to write about anything baseball-related. First of all, it’s almost impossible to distinguish between signal and noise, the Braves’ reputation for developing hitters is well-earned, but I’m still not sure Jarred Kelenic is going to hit .460 all year. Second: Even though games officially count in the standings, rosters change only slightly less than they do in spring training, and teams still manage their pitchers inside plastic bubbles, and with good reason after this last one! week of injuries everywhere! Finally, at this time of the season I have always watched a disproportionately large number of Phillies games, which is both my personal and professional failing.
However, that particular deficiency occasionally provides me with suitable material, as a presumed hitting analyst and a team trying to control its free-swinging habits while preserving its slugging potential is a natural fit. The Athletic’s Matt Gelb wrote an excellent piece on the difficulties of that very issue this week and how it has affected prominent members of their lineup, with a particular focus on Nick Castellanos.
Castellanos managed to reduce his chase rate slightly: in 2022 and 2023, his O-Swing percentage was 39.6 percent. So far in 2024, until the start of the game against the Pirates on April 11, that number has dropped to 36.5 percent. Better, but still well above league average (humiliating).
Something else Castellanos has eliminated from his game this year, although perhaps less intentionally: extra-base hits. Completely. So much so that he still didn’t have any going into that game last Thursday night. The reduction in swings outside the zone is clearly having some kind of effect on his ability to do damage inside the zone, and that makes sense when you look at where his slugging is, inside the zone, on this chart of his extra-base hits. in 2022 and 2023:
And compare their swing locations in 2022-2023 (left) versus this year (right):
The “hitting zone” Castellanos is looking for (the area where he is likely to swing 75 percent of the time on these pitches) is much smaller this year and much farther from the edge of the zone, particularly at the bottom of the plate. same. In theory, that should be a good thing, but we just saw that most of his extra-base hits come from exactly that area. The dilemma he faces is that, in an effort to exhibit a better eye, he no longer swings as much in areas where, historically, he has performed his best.
To complicate matters further, the pitches he is primarily trying to avoid chasing (breaking and off-speed) are being used to steal strikes against him, setting the worst rates of his career, and pitchers apparently recognize his reluctance to Pull the trigger against spin pitches that start at waist height and throw them into the zone more often. This has been common during the first fortnight of the season against the “new” Nick:
That’s where old Nick thrived, attacking exactly those secondary pitches that ended up in the bottom of the zone:
Last season, Castellanos passed up off-speed or breaking pitches that were called strikes just 6.7 percent of the time they were offered. This year, that figure nearly doubled to 11.2 percent. Not only does he not attack pitches that he has normally done damage against, because they are close enough to the edge of the zone to cause him a moment of hesitation, but those pitches are also used to steal strikes from him, putting him in a worse position in what counting refers to during the same at-bat.
One way to measure a hitter’s ability to stay aggressive while making good decisions about what to hit is with SEAGER, which attempts to quantify those two skills and measures the difference.
Season Selectivity (%) Released. hits passed (%) SEAGER 2021 49.3 23.8 25.5 2022 44.9 29.0 15.9 2023 45.3 29.9 15.4 2024 46.5 30.2 16.3
Castellanos’ current SEAGER score is the highest since the best year of his career, which was 2021, but ultimately it’s still pretty similar to his last two seasons, and the marginal gains he’s made have been made by leaving passing batting opportunities.
His approach to hitting is evidently changing, and this affects his timing, which manifests itself in several ways: he pulls the ball less, hits more harmless fly balls, and generally makes weaker contact compared to the rest of his career.
In some ways, he functions as an avatar for Philadelphia’s entire lineup: in fits and starts, ups and downs, and very clearly trying to reinvent himself or all of them on the fly. Like Castellanos, the previously ultra-aggressive Phillies have collectively improved on their stated goal of not expanding the zone, but the results have been mixed so far and they lack the quality of contact that distinguishes their lineup and makes them contenders.
Season Selectivity (%) Missed Bats Thrown (%) SEAGER Pursuit (%) ISO 2023 48.8 36.5 12.3 31.5 .182 (6th) 2024 47.9 37.5 10.4 29.8 .108 (29th)
This is a work in progress for Castellanos and the Phillies, a change they made heading into October after poor decisions led to its abrupt end last season. However, there is a long way to go before he and they reach the end, both on the schedule and at the plate.
Thank you for reading
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2024-04-15 11:09:19
#Chasing #chasing #Baseball #Prospectus
