Should Europe take the experience of Vladimir Putin as a warning about how relations with China might develop? After the Cold War, Russia was long considered a partner.
Then it became a competitor in the struggle over whether countries between the EU and Russia have a democratic future or fall back under Moscow’s control. Now Russia is a military opponent.
The EU and Germany recently redefined China from partner to strategic rival. Will Beijing’s claim to integrate Taiwan into the People’s Republic become a sticking point for which Xi Jinping risks a war like Putin did over Ukraine?
The EU-China summit on Friday was a red flag. Beijing is acting as if the war in Ukraine is not a turning point and its behavior is not worth mentioning.
A test for the EU: Force Putin to agree to a ceasefire together with China
It expects “business as usual” from the EU. She should accept that China acts like a tacit accomplice of Putin, does not condemn the war of aggression and counteracts the Western sanctions.
The interests of Europe and Ukraine demand that China use its considerable influence over Putin and its economic leverage to force an end to the killing. Without China’s toleration, Russia cannot go through the war.
But for Beijing it is only “a crisis” that requires no intervention. Europe failed this test of whether the EU can persuade Beijing to work in partnership to solve what is currently the most pressing global problem. As in previous conflicts, China prevailed.
More on the relationship between the EU and China in the Ukraine war at Tagesspiegel Plus:
On the other hand, one should neither equate China with Russia nor Xi with Putin. Xi is a nationalist who represents Beijing’s imperial interests much more openly than his predecessors.
Xi is not Putin, and China is acting differently than Russia
But his China is fundamentally different from Putin’s Russia. Xi is more risk averse and takes the economic consequences of a confrontation with the West far more seriously. China needs reliable growth. The citizens will only continue to accept the authoritarian system’s claim to power if it offers continuously increasing prosperity and solves the various problems at the same time.
These include environmental damage, social divisions, aging, contrasts between rich metropolises and poor rural areas, ethnic and religious conflicts. However, if this threatens to fail, it becomes all the more dangerous.
Then Xi is tempted to distract from socio-economic failure with aggressive nationalism and the conquest of disputed territories. In addition to Taiwan, there are islands in the South and East China Seas.
But even if Beijing fears war more than the Kremlin and reacts differently in general: China is an authoritarian regime and does not shy away from attempts at economic blackmail, such as those that Putin is trying to make with natural gas. This is shown by Xi’s harsh reactions to questions about the origins of the Covid pandemic or the prison camps for Uyghurs.
The EU-China Free Trade Agreement is on hold. China experts in the European Parliament like Reinhard Bütikofer have imposed sanctions on Beijing. You are no longer allowed to enter the country, the dialogue is cut off.
This makes the question of what lessons Germany and the EU are drawing from the conflict with Putin all the more urgent. China is a far more powerful opponent, roughly seven times as strong economically as Russia.
Trade through change has proven to be an illusion
Lesson One: The belief in change through trade has proven to be an illusion in Russia. In China, too, the mutual interdependence of companies and supply chains has not resulted in any lasting liberalization.
Lesson two: Interdependence is not a reliable guarantee of peace. Russia, as a buyer of its natural gas, oil and other raw materials, needs Europe no less urgently than Germany and many EU partners need supplies from there. That hasn’t stopped Putin from going to war or using gas as an economic weapon. Why should it be any different with Xi?
Lesson three: Even if an authoritarian regime knows its dependence on the West, it is more willing to risk the showdown. It calculates that it controls its citizens better than democratic governments control their societies.
When push comes to shove, the willingness to suffer is greater in Russia or China than in Germany, France or Spain. Democracies buckle earlier.
Democracies consider themselves more vulnerable than autocracies
Their governments also consider themselves more vulnerable. In the debate surrounding Putin’s threat to stop gas deliveries, Germany’s dependence played a far greater role than its dependence on payments for state finances.
Applied to China: The EU as an export market is indispensable for Beijing’s economic success. But does the EU dare to threaten China with restrictions if it doesn’t do more to persuade Putin to end the war in Ukraine? If not, why would Beijing think the EU would in a Taiwan war?
Lesson four: The EU should now dare more dosed confrontation. This sharpens your view of your own options. And reduces the risk that Xi – like Putin – believes that Europe is not capable of tough sanctions. Waiting until the case occurred did not prevent the Ukraine war.
