In this spring of 2024, a strange ballet is being performed in the 18th arrondissement of Paris. At the end of the morning, a black Mercedes van parks in front of a building. Around ten men of Chinese origin got off. They gather at the entrance, ring the intercom, before being checked by the police. Their arrival is however very innocent, they assure. They came to visit the Cavern, an urban farm located in the building’s parking lot. It doesn’t matter that this May 8, public holiday, the establishment is closed.
The neighbors were not mistaken in calling the police. The intruders are looking for Gulbahar Jalilova, a Kazakh of Uighur origin who escaped from a Chinese concentration camp in Xinjiang. In the complaint filed with the Paris judicial court, to which L’Express had access, Ms. Jalilova’s lawyers are outraged by this “intimidation action”, “all the more serious and worrying because it was put in place and carried out during the day, in the middle of Paris, in front of everyone.” According to DGSI notes consulted by The Worldone of the six people checked by the police even had “a service passport”, suggesting a direct link with the Chinese embassy. Taking place the day after Xi Jinping’s visit to France, the operation is symptomatic of the increasingly uninhibited practices of the Chinese secret services. Over the years, the Ministry of State Security (MSE or Guoanbu) and its relays have woven a sophisticated network in Paris.
“Voluntary return”
This base allows them to intimidate and control the diaspora. Sometimes with spectacular operations. In March 2024, the attempted forced repatriation of dissident Ling Huazhan is an example. The operation, revealed by France 2 and Challengeshad failed just before the boarding gates of Roissy-Charles-de-Gaulle airport, in the Paris region. But also with more discreet actions, flirting with the gray zone of legality. By cross-checking open source information, L’Express was able to sketch a worrying new pattern. Beyond dissidents, organizations well integrated into the French associative fabric strongly encourage vulnerable members of the Chinese diaspora in the Paris region to return to China. The practice fuels the idea of “voluntary return”, one of the themes favored by the Chinese Communist Party.
One of the main levers used by Beijing is a hybrid structure: clandestine police stations. In September 2022, the human rights NGO Safeguard Defenders revealed the presence of 102 undeclared police stations, spread across 53 identified countries – including France. At least four positions had been identified by the organization in Ile-de-France. “In theory, these stations are designed to give the diaspora additional administrative assistance,” describes André Gattolin, former senator and specialist in foreign interference. A sort of complement to the services provided by the Chinese embassy in France, with branches divided according to the different Chinese regions and their dialect.
Transnational repression
These unofficial “mini-consulates” have another purpose. A note from the Ministry of the Interior consulted by L’Express notes: “These police stations are also used to put pressure on the individuals that China is looking for to force them to return to the country.” Analysts cite an interview given in 2021 to Chinese media by Hu Renai, a textile entrepreneur based in Aubervilliers. He explains that “Chinese public security officials” had “entrusted him with the task of helping to convince a criminal who had fled to France for many years to return to China by paying him several visits”. At least one “return persuasion” operation would have been carried out in the Paris branch of the Wenzhou community.
The structure contributes to the “transnational repression” hatched by Beijing, this concept designating all of the repressive actions implemented by a regime to locate, intimidate and repatriate its opponents. China made it a priority in 2014 with Operation Fox Hunt. Launched to punish Chinese leaders accused of corruption who had taken refuge abroad, it quickly extended to dissidents. It was in this context that the first police stations were opened.
Lack of Chinese speakers
They are part of the doctrine of the United Front, a political strategy intended to promote the interests of the Party. “In many cases, these networks support Chinese security services by providing material and logistical support for intelligence operations,” observes Colin Reed, head of intelligence at Clock&Cloud, a former American domestic intelligence analyst. “Europe mainly focuses its attention on Russian hybrid warfare, but Beijing’s use of these police services abroad constitutes a similar challenge to its sovereignty. It remains unanswered.”
The DGSI, until now very focused on the jihadist threat, is now taking a close interest in Chinese interference. “Transnational repression is something we monitor, particularly regarding voluntary returns,” says a source close to the intelligence services. The agents try to identify the members of the clandestine structures, often very close to the embassy and consular services. “But our services have great difficulty penetrating the diaspora. The DGSI has long lacked Chinese speakers,” remarks André Gattolin.
Illegal actions
Summoned by the intelligence services, the identified leaders of the clandestine police stations were however “ordered to put an end to their activities”, explained the Ministry of the Interior this summer, in a response to a written question from MP Constance Le Grip. The nine structures counted by Beauvau would now be closed.
In 2025, at least two individuals were also the subject of an expulsion order issued by the former Minister of the Interior, Bruno Retailleau. White notes from the DGSI assign them responsibilities in running clandestine police stations, according to information from the Intelligence Online site. In one case, the administrative court suspended the execution of the order issued by Beauvau. The second person is said to have returned to China. “After the publication of our first report on clandestine police stations, many countries have been very clear on the illegality of these actions,” says Laura Harth, campaign director for Safeguard Defenders. “But transnational repression is based on a set of complex networks.”
Prosecuting the individuals responsible – and stopping their activities – is all the more difficult. In April 2024, Ling Huazhan’s repatriation attempt triggered the opening of a preliminary investigation by the National Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor’s Office. The latter was dismissed, L’Express learned from a source close to the investigation. The affair, however, highlighted several actors involved in the scheme allowing “voluntary returns”. On the embassy side, at least three people in post were suspected of being involved, including Liu Hui, second secretary of the overseas Chinese consular affairs office. An association of the Chinese diaspora, AixInTuan, (“Love and united hearts”) also seems to have been one of the driving forces behind this failed repatriation. In a press release relayed on the organization’s website, the Chinese embassy in Paris disputed the information from France 2 and Challenges, denouncing a “report based on lies and a fabricated story”.
Association “Love and united hearts”
Several elements, however, support the existence of an ecosystem intended to persuade members of the diaspora to return to China. “In particular the most fragile and the most vulnerable, not only the dissidents”, we slip towards Beauvau. First, because the association “Amour et cœurs unis”, founded in 2021, is established in Aubervilliers, at the address where the investigation of Challenges and France 2 noted the presence of a clandestine Chinese police station. Then, because the organization itself boasts on its site of facilitating returns to the country. In several articles hosted on the WeChat platform, AixInTuan explains that it provides assistance to the most vulnerable Chinese. The most recent case is that of Ms Hu, whose family “resides in China”. “Suddenly falling into a coma” in April 2025 after “serious head trauma”, she was taken care of by AixIntuan as well as by the Jiangxi association of France – the region from which she comes. In the article, the associations assure that “thanks to their help”, Ms. Hu’s brother “obtained a French visa through an accelerated procedure”, before she returned to China.
“These organizations play on the vagueness of their action: where does authentic help stop, and where does coercion begin?”
The embassy is present in the background. In several articles, the association displays its good relationship with Wan Lei, advisor to the Bureau of Consular Affairs and Overseas Chinese at the Chinese Embassy in France. In another, Liu Hui, second secretary appearing in the repatriation of Ling Huazhan, is cited as participating in the return to the country of a young Chinese woman who made a “suicide attempt” after a breakup. The case is not isolated: on her X account, Fengzhen Dong, a manager of the association, stages these voluntary departures. Regularly harnessed to a wheelchair, the patients pass through the airport departure hall with a smile. In its activity report for the year, the organization boasts of having participated in the repatriation of around fifteen Chinese. “AixinTuan also received financial support from the Chinese embassy,” a source close to the intelligence services tells us. Contacted by L’Express, neither AixinTuan nor the Chinese embassy have so far responded to our requests.
Other associations, however, claim returns of sick people, in connection with the embassy, notes Safeguard Defenders. “These organizations play on the vagueness of their action: where does authentic help stop, and where does coercion begin? It is always very difficult to know what happened, especially when the person has returned to China,” underlines Laura Harth. These initiatives are all the more difficult to trace as they target vulnerable and isolated people. “In this type of case, as with clandestine police stations, we must look for repetition. However, this is a pattern that we are seeing in France today, but also abroad,” notes the advocacy manager. Worrying enough to raise alarm: this mechanism should be the subject of a future report from the NGO, to be published at the start of the year.
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