outbreaks | Safety
Is the arsenal plane a solution to several modern problems?
The US Air Force began moving forward by testing its “arsenal plan” concept. In January, a special-purpose transport of the MC-130 dropped two pallets of air-to-ground ammunition from its loading ramp in a demonstration of conceptual evidence. If the concept proves viable, it could significantly expand the number of aircraft that the Air Force could use to deploy stalled weapons, a key priority for deciphering China’s A2 / AD system system. As Joseph Trevithick and Tyler Rogoway detail a The guide, Air Force testing so far has focused on surface-to-air ammunition, mainly because air-to-air ammunition is more complex and may need to be mounted on external pylons. The ammunition dropped in the test range from the fascinating acronym “CLEAVER” (Cargo Launch Expendable Air Vehicles with Extended Range), although the details of their range and payload remain uncertain.
As many readers know, the “arsenal ship” involved a large ship carrying a huge number of cruise missiles, targeted and guided to their targets by a plethora of space and airborne sensors. In theory, the arsenal ship would have had to unload aircraft carriers, which could then use their long-range attack wings for alternative missions. Of course, the Navy has not yet pulled the trigger on the arsenal ship, despite the post-conversion OhioGuided missile submarine classes (SSGN) play a somewhat similar role.
The idea behind the arsenal aircraft is to equip a cargo aircraft with ammunition on pallets capable of hitting targets at close range (beyond the effective range of the surface-to-air missiles and the most interceptors). Payloads and sensors have become so sophisticated that the delivery system no longer needs to be. The arsenal plane avoids elaborate expenses and the risk of developing a stealthy and penetrating aircraft to deliver ammunition against the outer shell of an area access / denial system. It also allows the Air Force to exploit its already existing air transport resources (which are considerable) for strike missions.
The strategic logic of developing an arsenal plan capability is clear. In low intensity conflicts, the use of such aircraft could unload the load of faster and more capable combat aircraft such as the B-1B, the B-52 or the growing fleet of invisible bombers. In a high-intensity conflict, the use of such aircraft (both from the merchant fleet and from the fleet of older bombers) could reduce the workload of the invisible fleet of the USAF, while offering a much greater number of platforms for attacks against external nodes of sensors and missiles in an A2 / AD shell. A certain appreciation of this reality undoubtedly stems from an assessment of the threat that Soviet-era bombers (whether flown from China or Russia) continue to pose to US forces, despite their ancient air structures. He suggests that the concept of “distributed lethality” increasingly drives thinking in both the United States Navy and the US Air Force.
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