Ajax Winter Transfers: Deals, Sales & Squad Analysis

The image that remains of the past winter transfer period is that of the absence of an experienced ‘six’. That is understandable, but does not do justice to what happened next. The winter window started with a logical and financially sensible plan: temporary solutions, limited risks and cleaning up the last remnants of the old contract file. The goal was clear: to make the starting position for the summer as good as possible for the new technical management.

That plan has only been partially implemented. The focus was strongly on incoming transfers, while it remained remarkably quiet regarding outgoing transfers. The result: this winter, space was used creatively in this financial year, but the structural task for the summer has hardly decreased. In this edition of Diepe Zakken we look back at the winter deals and their financial impact.

The goals were set at the beginning of January. Ajax wanted to strengthen itself in a few positions (backs, a six and possibly an attacker), with experienced players, preferably through temporary or financially flexible constructions. At the same time, space had to be created by phasing out or divesting old contracts. Not to solve everything now, but so as not to burden the summer with extra ballast.

During the first few weeks, this plan seemed to hold up. There was peace, a clear order and visible discipline. However, Ajax had to respond to unexpected departures and the plan around six turned out to be too naive. More about that later. First the deals that did go ahead.

With Takehiro Tomiyasu, the risk is clear: his fitness. If he is available, he is a clear asset in terms of sport. Ajax has built in that risk financially. Exact contract details are not known, but everything points to a construction with the minimum annual salary for non-EU players (260,000 euros), supplemented with bonuses based on playing time.

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For Tomiyasu, the incentive is not primarily in salary, but in playing time and the prospect of the World Cup. As a result, Ajax does not have to compete at Premier League levels and the financial risk remains limited. Typical of a deal that only works if sport and finance meet. And with a happy marriage, Ajax can also benefit from the experienced Japanese next season.

Kenneth Taylor’s departure had been in the air for some time. The sale to Lazio for 16.85 million euros provides Ajax with a significant book profit. As a self-trained player, Taylor has no book value, which means that the vast majority of the transfer fee (approximately 14.5 million euros after costs) counts as pure profit. A good addition to the 47 million euros transfer profit of the summer.

In addition, there are bonuses of up to three million euros, a resale percentage of ten to fifteen percent of the profit and the full solidarity contribution of five percent of the total transfer amount. Financially, this is a textbook example of how Ajax capitalizes on its training: direct profit and participation in future steps.

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The transfer of Oleksandr Zinchenko was complex, but financially smart. Four parties were involved: Ajax, Arsenal, Nottingham Forest and the player himself. Nottingham quickly agreed, because they no longer had to pay the remaining salary. For Arsenal, a permanent sale was more attractive than renting, as they wanted to reduce their Premier League costs after an expensive summer.

Ajax took over Zinchenko for 1.5 million euros, despite a book loss for Arsenal. Crucially, Arsenal were able to eliminate both the depreciation (approximately €8.75 million per year) and the salary burden (approximately €7–8 million per year) in one fell swoop. To compensate Zinchenko for his lower salary at Ajax, he probably received an amount from England.

The money that Ajax wanted to spend on rent seems to have largely ended up with the player. What remains for Ajax is an experienced force at limited costs. A textbook deal, made possible by the financial pressure at the selling club.

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Raúl Moro’s departure was mainly player-driven. Ajax cooperated, but did so with an eye for risk management. Osasuna paid six million euros for fifty percent of the economic rights, implying a total valuation of twelve million euros, close to the original purchase amount.

The construction includes two million euros in relatively easy-to-achieve bonuses, linked to additional percentages of economic rights (five percent per 500,000 euros). The last ten percent is more difficult to achieve. Realistically, Ajax will have about thirty percent left, which will allow it to make a significant contribution in the next transfer. A transfer in the future of around twelve or thirteen million euros is needed for Ajax to break even.

Yes, this means a book loss of approximately five million euros this season. But on the other hand, Moro will completely disappear from the depreciation and salary costs and that Ajax will no longer have to wait to sell in the summer.

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Maher Carrizo was recruited as Moro’s indirect successor. Due to his departure, Ajax was able to allow Carrizo to acclimatize quietly. The deal also fits in financially with the pattern of risk spreading.

Ajax signs the player for approximately eight million euros, while Vélez Sarsfield retains fifty percent of the economic rights. Vélez bears no costs and has no control; it is purely about financial participation. The often mentioned 5.5–6 million euros is the net amount for Vélez, not Ajax’s total investment.

Due to the depreciation over four and a half years, the annual burden remains limited. Ajax retains control to buy back additional rights later (up to one hundred percent), depending on Carrizo’s development. Flexible, manageable and suitable for a club in restructuring.

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The arrival of Maarten Paes makes sense in retrospect. Jordi Cruijff’s connection with the Indonesian national team, his contract only had one year left and SEG is his agent. And there are clear international commercial opportunities. The transfer fee of approximately one and a half million euros provides FC Dallas with a small profit.

With a three-and-a-half-year contract, depreciation is low. In terms of salary, he is in the same range as Remko Pasveer, whom he replaces. For Ajax this means: a younger goalkeeper, limited costs and potentially extra commercial value.

Reletting Gastón Ávila and Branco van den Boomen provides temporary salary relief, but not a structural solution. This had been the moment to take a loss and say a final goodbye. Ajax could have borne those losses in the accounting. Now they will probably come back, because there is no mandatory purchase option.

With James McConnell, it is unlikely that Ajax will see anything back from the rent paid. Financially, this file mainly remains in the ‘back door’ category.

The attempt to take over Sano from NEC fell out of place. An amount of up to fifteen million euros for a long-term contract, for a profile that did not fit the sought-after experienced six. It was a sporting matter to defend it; financially it was a heavy burden for future seasons.

Ajax hoped for a quick ‘steal’ and purely in itself that amount can be justified for one of the best players in the Eredivisie (and the competitor). But the timing, media attention and outcome make them look like a muddy figure. Especially because Ajax was ultimately left without six.

Bottom line, Ajax has mainly added temporary costs this winter, which largely fall within this financial year. Thanks to transfer profits and European income, the club is in the black. The impact is more limited for the summer: hardly any structural space has been created.

Smart, creative deals, but little real relief. The message for the summer will sound familiar, now from a new technical director: sell first.

José de la Verde (X: j_berden)

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