Como is sixth in Serie A, Venezia is third in Serie B. They have the common goal of transforming themselves into brands capable of selling entertainment, hospitality and lifestyle. It helps to have a world-famous city and lake as a home base.
The match is only part of an experience
In “average” European football, one match is no longer enough. TV rights and sponsors reward the global scale; For many clubs, local revenues are capped, while sporting costs remain volatile. Hence a repositioning that resembles that of many experience companies: transforming the company into a brand capable of selling entertainment, hospitality and lifestyle, reducing dependence on results in the field. Within this trajectory, Como 1907 and Venezia FC represent two different but complementary strategies.
Both can rely on already very strong brand assets: the lake and the lagoon. The ownership (Sent Entertainment, Djarum group) of Como has in fact told a “Disney” model, with the lake as the setting and the club as the “anchor” of premium experiences. The strategy takes shape in an internal tour operator (Sent Tourism), which offers matchday packages with VIP access and gourmet hospitality, local tours and “lake living” experiences: the city as an extension of the stadium and the match as the “third act” of a longer day.
The flow numbers in the Lario city explain why the bet is consistent with the demand: arrivals from abroad in the city went from 335,737 (2019) to 505,542 (2024) and presences from abroad from 716,275 to 1,127,893. But the “typical” stay is short: in 2019 and in the three-year period 2022-2024 the average is around 2.1 days (the 2020-2021 increase is a pandemic anomaly). Translated: Como is often a weekend or a stopover. In this structure, the “game + lake” package becomes a natural product: it reduces coordination costs for the visitor, concentrates value in a few hours and lends itself to being sold as a high-priced experience rather than a simple ticket.
The strategies of Como and Venice
The data from the Lombardy Region on tourist flows in the city of Como between 2019 and 2024 highlight, net of Covid, a continuously growing trend driven above all by short-stay international tourism (2-3 days), ideal for hospitality packages sold as luxury “experiences”. This is where the “lake effect” comes in and, more precisely, the “Clooney effect”. In an interview, Giuseppe Rasella (director of the Chamber of Commerce of Como and Lecco) says he is convinced of the existence of a structured “Clooney effect” of football on lake tourism: the football club does not create international demand from scratch, but intercepts and directs it, with strong attention to the high-end segment. Rasella also underlines the other half of the equation, the offer: since 2021 large international funds have accelerated investments in the Lake Como hotel network. Graziano Manetti, Confcommercio director, confirms the same reading and describes football as a detonator: a marketing amplifier that makes territorial promotion more efficient thanks to storytelling, rituals (matchday) and exportable content (events, partnerships, merchandising).
Venezia FC follows a complementary path: it builds brand equity before the volume, using fashion and creative direction as an accelerator. The shirts are launched as editorials and the city becomes the heart of the positioning; in this logic, the home kit shirt was sold out on the first day of sales and “around 95 percent” of online purchases came from outside Italy. It’s a case of pricing power symbolic: aesthetics and belonging are sold, not just results.
The role of stadiums
The infrastructural piece completes both bets. In Como, the crux is the Sinigaglia stadium: if only a matchday container remains, the economic incentive to invest is more fragile; if, however, it becomes a place capable of generating revenues even without a match (hospitality, retail, services), the structure of incentives changes and the volatility typical of football is reduced. In Venice, the project of the new stadium in the “Bosco dello sport” is described as part of a larger master plan (multifunctional arena, greenery, paths), that is, as a “hybrid” infrastructure designed for non-sporting events and uses: exactly the type of asset that transforms the club into a platform for urban and tourist consumption.
Furthermore, Venezia can also count on significant potential to replicate the Como model, enhancing the combination of sporting event, hospitality and the timeless charm of the lagoon city.
The point, therefore, is not to snub football: it is to reduce its economic fragility by transforming society into a platform of place branding and non-matchday revenues. But the trade-offs remain (fan alienation, gentrification, friction with overtourism). To hold up, governance and metrics are needed: average attendance and permanence, per capita spending, deseasonalization, pressure on urban services, reputational sentiment, share of extra-stadium revenues and ability to convert a “one-off” visitor into a recurring customer (CRM, content, community). In a word, the guidance and vision of a public intervention (municipality or public bodies) capable of combining the interest of private individuals with the impact on the local economy.
The economic situation of the two clubs
However, both clubs must guarantee a competitive team. Thus, the revenues from these extra-core activities become crucial in a context of budgets marked by significant and persistent losses over time. As with other clubs, traditional sources of revenue are not suitable to cover an increasingly onerous cost structure. In fact, as emerges from the attached tables, the comparison between the financial statements of Venice and Como shows two companies sharing strong growth in size and substantial losses, but with very different economic strategies and risk profiles.
In terms of revenues, the two clubs are at very similar levels, around 50 million euros. However, Venezia has a less legible revenue structure: it is not possible to reconstruct its composition in detail from the balance sheet, with the exception of the item relating to tickets and season tickets.
Como, on the contrary, shows a more complex and dynamic revenue structure. Alongside television rights, sponsorships, commercial activities and above all the capital gains generated by the management of footballers play an important role. This profile highlights a company that is investing decisively in the valorisation of the brand and the player base, aiming for rapid growth that goes beyond the sporting perimeter alone.
Moving on to costs, the difference between the two teams becomes even more evident. Venezia maintains a relatively controlled cost structure: the increase in expenses, in particular those for personnel (largely attributable to the players), appears significant but proportionate to the growth in revenues. Depreciation linked to player contracts also remains at sustainable levels.
Como, on the contrary, has a much heavier cost structure, driven above all by personnel costs and depreciation. These items grow at a significantly higher rate than operating revenues, signaling a clear strategic choice: invest massively today to build a competitive team, accepting high losses in the short term.
The approach is reflected in the final result. Venezia recorded a significant but relatively limited loss (around 36 million euros) and an improvement compared to the previous year, a sign of a model that is progressively tending towards balance. For Como, however, the operating loss is much larger (over 100 million euros), consistent with a phase of strong expansion financed by shareholders, with characteristics similar to those of a start-up.
Looking at the active balance sheet, Como has an overall size that is approximately double that of Venezia, a sign of a very intense investment cycle, largely concentrated on the value of the players’ cards. Even on the liabilities side, the differences between the two clubs are marked. Como finances growth mainly through a significant strengthening of its equity and heavy debt to other clubs, linked to player purchases. Venezia, on the contrary, adopts a more prudent approach: the capital structure is less expansive but also less exposed, supported by a plurality of financing sources and an overall lower level of risk.
In summary, Venezia follows a logic of consolidation and sustainability, trying to grow without compromising the economic balance. Como, on the other hand, adopts a decisive, aggressive investment model, aiming for accelerated growth and accepting high losses as the price to pay for higher sporting ambitions. Two different strategies, both coherent, but with very different horizons and risks.
Table 1
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