It is unusual for spy chiefs to mock their rivals openly. But last month, Bill Burns, the director of the CIA, could not resist the temptation to claim that the war in Ukraine had been an advantage for his agency. The comment may have touched the sensitive spot of the Russian colleagues. These, in fact, failed to prepare for the invasion and were then expelled from Europe en masse. But new evidence collected by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), a think tank from London, show that they have learned from their mistakes, that they have refined their methods and that they are embarking on a new phase of political warfare against the West.
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The last few years had been very bad for Russian spies. In 2020, operatives of the FSB, Russia’s security service, clumsily executed the first attempt to poison Aleksei Navalny, the opponent of Putin who died last week in circumstances not yet clarified in a capital punishment Arctic security. They were mocked for applying the Novichok to their underwear.
The FSB subsequently gave the Kremlin a highly watered-down view of how the war would go, exaggerating Ukraine’s internal weaknesses. He failed to prevent Western agencies from obtaining and making public Russian plans to invade Ukraine. And they were unwilling or unable to stop the revolt of Yevgeny Prigozhin, leader of the mercenaries of the Wagner Group. The SVR, Russia’s foreign intelligence agency, saw its presence in Europe undermined, with around 600 officers expelled from embassies across the continent.
The RUSI analysis, conducted by Jack Watling, Nick Reynolds and Oleksandr Daniliuk, a former adviser to both Ukraine’s defense minister and foreign intelligence chief, is based on documents “obtained from Russian special services” and in interviews with “relevant official bodies”. By the end of 2022 Russia realized it needed a more honest analysis of its agencies. And he placed Sergei Kirienko, the deputy secretary of the Kremlin, at the head of the “committees of special influence”. These coordinate operations against the West and then evaluate them.
This change in personnel appears to have produced more consistent propaganda campaigns. In Moldova, for example, a previously scattered disinformation effort has become more consistent. He linked the request for membership to the European Union to President Maia Sandu, while personally accusing her of the country’s economic problems. Campaigns aimed at undermining European support for Ukraine have also increased. In January, German experts published details of how hundreds of thousands of notes were spread daily, in German, from a network of 50,000 accounts in a single month on the X platform. On February 12, France exposed a large network of sites Russian websites that spread disinformation in France, Germany and Poland.
New methods
Meanwhile the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence agency, has also corrected its methods. In recent years Unit 29155 – which had attempted to assassinate Sergei Skripal, a former GRU officer, in Salisbury, Britain in 2018 – saw many of its troops, activities and facilities exposed by the website Bellingcat. The research group relies on public information and leaked Russian databases. The GRU concluded that its personnel were leaving too many digital trails, particularly by taking their mobile phones to sensitive locations associated with Russian intelligence. He also realized that the expulsion of Russian intelligence officers from Europe had made it difficult to mount operations and control agents abroad, one of the reasons why the invasion of Ukraine go bad
The result was a total overhaul, which began in 2020 but accelerated after the start of the war. General Andrei Averianov, head of Unit 29155, was, despite his mistakes, promoted to Deputy Secretary of the GRU and established a new Special Activities Service. Unit 29155 staff no longer carry personal or work telephones in their facilities; now they use landlines.
Another example of how Russian spies have turned a disaster into an opportunity is the case of the Wagner Group. After Prigozhin’s never-solved death while flying in one of his planes, Russian special services broke up the criminal military business conglomerate. The FSB would keep the domestic companies and the SVR the media arms, like the troll farms that interfered in the 2016 US presidential election.
The GRU obtained the foreign military units, divided into a volunteer corps for Ukraine and an expeditionary corps, managed by General Averianov, for the rest of the world. The result of this consolidation is a revitalized Russian threat in Africa. Shortly after Prigozhin’s death, General Averianov visited several African capitals to deliver what RUSI describes as a “regime survival package”. In theory, the proposals involve the GRU providing military muscle and propaganda to local elites against local rivals. In return, Russia would obtain economic concessions, such as lithium mines and gold refineries, and thus gain influence over enemies. Prigozhin is dead; its influence does not.
Cyber activity
On the other hand, Russian cyber activity continues to grow. In December the US and UK issued public warnings about Star Blizzard, an elite FSB hacking group that has been targeting NATO countries for years. The following month Microsoft said that Cozy Bear, a group related to the SVR, had penetrated email accounts belonging to some of the company’s most senior executives. This was in addition to a sophisticated GRU cyber attack on Ukraine’s power grid, which caused a blackout apparently coordinated with Russian missile attacks on the city itself.
The revamp of the Russian intelligence apparatus comes at a crucial time in the East-West competition. An annual report by Norway’s intelligence service, published on February 12, warned that in Ukraine Russia was “seizing the initiative and gaining military advantage”. The Estonian equivalent, published just a day later, said the Kremlin “anticipates a possible conflict with NATO in the coming decade.”
The priority for Russian spies is to prepare for this conflict not only by stealing secrets, but by widening cracks within NATO, undermining support for Ukraine in America and Europe, and eroding Western influence in the Global South. In contrast, there has been very little Russian sabotage against supplies destined for Ukraine from Europe. One reason is the Kremlin’s fear of escalation. Another is that the Russians cannot do everything, everywhere, at once.
2024-02-26 04:00:27
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