It rattles in the capital: Hertha, who dreams of Europe, is in the middle of a relegation battle and fires trainers and managers. One of the two decisions was overdue.
Be honest: didn’t you expect Hertha BSC to be much higher up in the table before the season? Some even rated the Berliners as a candidate for the Champions League. But the bitter reality looks different: After 18 match days, the club from the capital is 14th with only 17 points.
A sobering record for a club that has spent almost 150 million euros in transfer fees for players in the past year and a half. Instead of trembling before possible second division games in Sandhausen or Heidenheim, Hertha wanted to dream of trips to Lisbon or London. Not surprisingly, coach Bruno Labbadia and managing director Michael Preetz had to leave on Sunday.
How did it come about, despite these high investments, that Hertha is in a relegation battle?
The reason lies in the executive suite
The answer to this can not be found on the sidelines, but in the executive suite of Hertha. The mistakes made by former coach Bruno Labbadia were not Hertha’s main problem, it was the decisions made by manager Michael Preetz. Since the departure of the former coach Pál Dárdai in the summer of 2019, Preetz has made too many mistakes.
Especially when it comes to transfers, the “Tall One”, as he is called in Berlin, went wrong too often. Dárdai’s first successor Ante Čović wanted to play attractive, offensive football. But he didn’t get the players he needed. An example: Preetz’s transfer to the king for Čović was Dodi Lukébakio. A player who is predestined for counter football due to his speed and his ability to finish the run. Quick pass combinations are not his forte.
Ante Čović was dismissed as Hertha coach after only 14 competitive games. (Source: Sven Simon / imago images)
And so Čović failed with a squad that was still focused on Dárdai’s counter-football. Jürgen Klinsmann followed. A coach who, together with his assistant Alexander Nouri, wanted to play a football similar to that of Dárdai. Hertha caught up with Klinsmann – and bought big. There came Matheus Cunha (18 million euros), Santiago Ascacíbar (10 million), Krzysztof Piątek (24 million) and Lucas Tousart (25 million, but only came in the summer).
Expensive investments that matched Klinsmann’s playing style. Except for Matheus Cunha, who fits very well into several systems. But in the first earnings crisis under Klinsmann it crashed. The trainer gave up. After a few games under Alexander Nouri, Bruno Labbadia came along. But Labbadia’s style of play is again more focused on possession, more active, more offensive. The player material that he found only partially matched it. To this day, he only got warm with Matheus Cunha from the transfers from the Klinsmann era. Neither Piątek, nor Tousart or Ascacíbar could convince.
Michael Preetz was too often wrong in his transfer policy recently. (Source: Andreas Gora / imago images)
In the summer of 2020, Manager Preetz made several wrong decisions that led to today’s crisis:
- He let several leading players like Vedad Ibišević, Salomon Kalou or Per Skjelbred go without replacing them. There was hardly any hierarchy at Hertha. The squad consists of many young players who may have talent but need leadership from the team. They didn’t find it there. No wonder it took Bruno Labbadia until the end of September to appoint a captain. Too often Hertha seemed headless on the pitch. If there was a residue, there was no picking up. Their heads were hung, allegations were only directed at the man next to them. The public memorabilia for capricious top stars like Matheus Cunha and Dodi Lukébakio only came from the coach. In the absence of Dedryck Boyata, vice-captain Niklas Stark even spoke good games like the 0-0 win against Mainz or the 0-0 win in Cologne. Hertha cannot claim such services.
- Preetz bought too few players for Labbadia’s style of play. Labbadia wanted a wall striker, several wingers, a new goalkeeper and a strong right-back. Plus creativity for the center. With Jhón Córdoba he got a good wall striker, with Alexander Schwolow a good goalkeeper and with Mattéo Guendouzi the creativity for the midfield. But not a single winger came. On the right back came Deyovaisio Zeefuik from FC Groningen, who was more of a perspective player than an immediate solution.
And so Labbadia started an attempt that could hardly work: to form a team without many leading players that should learn a football that does not suit them.
That’s not to say that Labbadia was flawless. Several times he was stubborn in his decisions, putting players in positions they were not comfortable with. But the reason that Hertha has become a laughing stock in the Bundesliga is not Labbadia.
The reason is the squad planning of ex-manager Michael Preetz.
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