Gadi Eisenkot as Israel’s PM: 6 Scenarios for Middle East Foreign Policy

Following a political shift in Israel, Gadi Eisenkot faces a complex diplomatic and security landscape across the Middle East. While regional analysts do not anticipate a complete 180-degree turn in foreign policy after the trauma of the October 7, 2023, attacks, a transition from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to a center-right administration under Eisenkot would introduce distinct strategic realignments regarding Iran, Gaza, and the occupied West Bank.

Targeting Iran and Managing the Post-Midterms Diplomatic Window

Benjamin Netanyahu has maintained maximum pressure on Washington to launch a new operation against Iran, publishing an apocalyptic image of a nuclear mushroom cloud over Tel Aviv on X just days before the October 27 election with the warning that a nuclear-armed Iran would change everything. An American military plan reportedly rests on the president’s desk, with any potential green light contingent on the U.S. midterms. Netanyahu could leverage this transitional period to push for a wartime national unity government. If Eisenkot assumes the premiership, his doctrine toward Tehran would remain largely hawkish, according to Paul Salem, a researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Eisenkot has previously proposed establishing kill zones around sites containing 60% enriched uranium. However, he might also choose to temporize, allowing U.S.-led financial asphyxiation policies to further strain the Iranian economy.

Pursuing Gaza De-escalation and Disarmament

Gaza remains a focal point of Eisenkot’s criticism of the current administration, specifically regarding the ongoing sovereignty of Hamas three years after the October 7 massacres. If the opposition leader takes power, he aims to dismantle Hamas’s governance within an 18-month window through a more assertive diplomatic strategy. This approach involves implementing the 20-point Trump plan introduced in September 2025, facilitating the entry of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza from Egypt, and reopening dialogue with the Palestinian Authority. David Khalfa, co-founder of the Atlantic Middle East Forum, noted that Eisenkot built his political platform on the critique that Netanyahu lacked a concrete day-after strategy, intending instead to pursue de-escalation, partial disarmament, and a gradual military withdrawal from the strip.

Suspending the E1 Settlement Project in the West Bank

Occupied West Bank policy serves as a primary friction point between Eisenkot and Netanyahu. Eisenkot has promised to be much firmer with violent settlers and to encourage administrative detentions, arguing that by allying with the far-right of Ben Gvir and Smotrich and naming David Zini to lead the Shin Bet, Netanyahu has transformed the occupied territories into a hotbed of Jewish extremist violence against Palestinians. While both figures support settlements, Eisenkot could reverse one of the current coalition’s flagship projects, which consists of splitting the West Bank in two. UCLA political scientist Dov Waxman observed that Eisenkot would suspend or even stop construction in a settlement zone called E1 (aiming to build nearly 3,400 housing units east of Jerusalem), which compromises the prospects for establishing a Palestinian state.

Redefining Lebanon Security Zones and Reintegrating French Diplomacy

Security consensus persists between the two contenders for the post of Prime Minister regarding Hezbollah, though tactical disagreements remain regarding buffer zones. While Netanyahu aims to maintain a 10-kilometer security zone in southern Lebanon controlled by the IDF, Eisenkot favors reducing the footprint to 8 kilometers, deeming it sufficient to protect border towns from anti-tank missiles. Diplomatically, Eisenkot is considering a proposal reported by the Jerusalem Post to re-engage France alongside the United States to assist the Lebanese state army in disarming Hezbollah. Yaakov Amidror, former chief of staff to Benjamin Netanyahu, cautioned that any diplomatic arrangement remains contingent on the attitude of the Lebanese Shia militia in the coming weeks, noting that the moment they fire missiles and rockets, Israel will use the full power of its air force and expand the IDF’s zone of control in southern Lebanon.

Maintaining the Security Status Quo in Post-Assad Syria

Syrian relations present another divergence between Washington and Jerusalem. While the U.S. has normalized ties with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, Eisenkot continues to characterize him as a jihadist linked to the Islamic State, citing his past military operations against the group when he led the IDF. Consequently, Eisenkot does not plan an immediate withdrawal from Mount Hermon and other strategic Syrian positions while Russian and Turkish military forces maintain a presence following the fall of Bashar al-Assad. Geographer and Syria specialist Fabrice Balanche noted that al-Sharaa remains constrained by internal jihadist factions that would view strategic agreements with Israel as treasonous.

Proposing a Sunni States Security Architecture

Saudi Arabia has reportedly received clandestine Israeli intelligence via American intermediaries during its ongoing conflict with Houthi rebels, despite lacking formal diplomatic ties. Eisenkot advocates for an expanded security framework, suggesting in an interview with the Times of Israel the creation of a Sunni states NATO alliance. However, full Saudi integration into the Abraham Accords remains distant. Former Pentagon Middle East policy director David Des Roches noted that retaining far-right ministers in the Israeli government makes normalization impossible, and any future Saudi engagement would require substantial concessions toward the Palestinians to satisfy domestic public opinion in Riyadh.