The global trajectory of human society is increasingly defined by a shift toward self-imposed solitude, a phenomenon driven by rising income levels and the externalization of traditional family functions, according to economist Branko Milanovic. In his latest work, Le Monde à l’ère capitaliste, the City University of New York professor argues that as societies grow wealthier, the average household size shrinks, signaling a fundamental transformation in how humans choose to live.
The Economic Drivers of Modern Solitude
Milanovic identifies a clear correlation between economic development and the decline of the multi-generational household. Data points from diverse global regions illustrate this trend: households in high-income nations like Denmark and Norway average approximately 2.2 members, a stark contrast to the significantly larger, multi-generational family units found in countries like Mali or Senegal, where averages often exceed nine people.

Historically, the family functioned as a primary economic unit, providing essential support systems—such as elder care and shared labor—that were not subject to market transactions. Milanovic notes that as these activities are increasingly outsourced to the “gig economy,” the necessity of the traditional family structure diminishes. He posits that when individuals achieve a certain level of financial independence, they prioritize living alone, a trend reinforced by the digital age, where internet connectivity and artificial intelligence provide alternatives to traditional physical social interaction.
Challenging the Illusion of Degrowth
Addressing the current climate discourse, Milanovic characterizes the concept of “degrowth” as a form of “magical thinking” that ignores the realities of global poverty. He observes that the median post-tax income in the West sits at the 90th percentile of the global income distribution. To elevate 90% of the world’s population to this standard would require a 2.7-fold increase in global GDP, a figure that would inevitably lead to a surge in CO2 emissions.
The economist challenges projections—such as those discussed by Thomas Piketty—that suggest a global convergence toward a 5,000-euro income level while maintaining “sobriety.” Milanovic argues these scenarios are ideologically driven rather than empirically sound. He contends that the tools used to reduce inequality between the end of World War II and the 1980s—namely strong unions, mass education, and high taxation—are currently ineffective due to a widespread decline in faith in state institutions and a significant drop in unionization rates across Western nations.
The Great Convergence and Global Inequality
Despite the challenges in Western economies, Milanovic highlights a significant reduction in global inequality since the late 1990s. This “great convergence” is largely attributed to the rapid industrialization and growth of China, alongside significant gains in India, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand. The global Gini coefficient, a standard measure of inequality, fell from approximately 70 in 1988 to 60 by 2018.

However, he warns that this phase of neoliberal globalization is reaching its conclusion. The rise of “national-liberalism,” characterized by protectionist trade policies and economic coercion, has replaced the open-market ideals of the 1990s. From Donald Trump’s tariff policies to European efforts to secure supply chains against Chinese imports, nations are increasingly prioritizing sovereignty over the unfettered movement of goods and capital.
The Industrial Decline of Russia
Milanovic offers a critical assessment of the Russian economy, describing it as trapped in a state of regressive technological substitution. Following the invasion of Ukraine and subsequent international sanctions, Russia has struggled to maintain its industrial base. He points to the aviation sector as a prime example, where a lack of access to Western components like those from Boeing or Airbus has forced a reliance on “industrial cannibalization”—stripping working machines for parts to keep others operational.
He suggests this decline is exacerbated by a “brain drain” of highly qualified professionals who find themselves in institutions that cannot match their skill levels. According to Milanovic, this unique historical scenario, where a large-scale economy is forcibly cut off from global technological markets, presents a systemic threat to the longevity of the current regime.
A New Era of Global Competition
The perception of Western decline, or “narcissistic injury,” is becoming more apparent to middle-class citizens, Milanovic argues. Events such as the FIFA World Cup serve as indicators of this shift, where global demand drives prices beyond the reach of the average Western consumer. He draws a parallel to the former Yugoslavia, where high productivity was often obscured by inefficient systems and material shortages. He cautions that Western economies cannot rely solely on hourly productivity metrics while ignoring the rapid innovation cycles currently dominated by the United States and China.
As these global forces continue to reshape the economic landscape, the transition toward a more solitary, digitized society appears to be the next stage in human social evolution. Whether this “desired solitude” will provide the stability that traditional social structures once offered remains the central question for the future of the globalized, capitalist world.