The Olympic Games have always been presented as an economic boost for the host country or city. Just as often, they are considered an economic hole in state, regional and municipal budgets. Both statements are true, so how is this double reality possible? At the same time they act as infrastructural development and revitalization of the international image.
In the case of the Winter Olympics, however, the historical data tells a very clear and clear story. Faced with certain, measurable and almost always increasing costs, the direct economic benefits are often limited, if not marginal. The Milan-Cortina 2026 Olympicshowever, may represent a change of direction compared to previous winter editions.
Structurally high costs, structurally limited revenues
The specificity of the Winter Olympics lies in their small scale compared to the Summer Games, combined however with ainfrastructural intensity much higher. The venues are often located in mountainous areas, with small demographic catchment areas and a pre-existing infrastructure that is insufficient to support the event without massive investments.
The main expenditure items are:
- operating costs of the Organizing Committee (OCOG);
- specific sports facilities, difficult to convert;
- indirect infrastructures (roads, railways, security, telecommunications).
According to data collected by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and reworked by the University of Oxford, all the Olympics (both winter and summer) from 1960 to today have recorded budget overrunsbut the winter editions have an average overrun of more than 170% in real terms.
On the revenue front, the situation is similar. Ticket revenues are limited by the small number of events and spectators, while television rights (although growing over time) remain lower than the Summer Olympics. The result is a structural dependence on public financing.
Turin 2006: the weight of the unfinished legacy
Turin 2006 represents an emblematic case for Italy. The overall cost of the event, including infrastructure and indirect public expenses, is estimated at approximately 3.6 billion euroswhile the Organizing Committee’s revenues stopped at around 1.2 billion.
The urban transformation of the city has been real, but uneven. While some interventions (such as the strengthening of urban transport) have had a lasting effect, many mountain facilities have remained underused or abandoned. The reports of the Italian Court of Auditors have highlighted how the burden of the debt and post-Olympic maintenance costs has fallen on local authorities for years, without a proportionate economic return.
Vancouver 2010: selective benefits, persistent debt
The Canadian edition is often cited as a relatively virtuous example. The total estimated cost is around 7.6 billion dollarswith OCOG revenues of approximately 2.5 billion. The positive impact was mainly concentrated on transportation and housing, particularly along the Vancouver–Whistler corridor.
However, the Auditor General of British Columbia highlighted how the Olympic Village generated significant debt for the city of Vancouver, which was only partially absorbed in subsequent years. Also in this case, the overall economic balance for the public sector remains negative, despite management considered more efficient than in other editions.
Sochi 2014: the cost of soft power
With an estimated cost of over 50 billion dollarsSochi 2014 is the most expensive Olympics in history. World Bank data and international journalistic investigations agree on one point: the direct economic return for the region has been minimal.
The explanation must be sought elsewhere. Sochi was an operation of nation branding and geopolitical projection, rather than an economic investment. In this sense, the event produced political and symbolic benefits, which are difficult to quantify, but did not generate a sustainable economic impact in the medium to long term.
PyeongChang 2018: controlled costs, zero use
South Korea has tried to keep costs down, stopping around 13 billion dollars. Despite this, the event left a legacy of poorly used facilities. The most emblematic case is the Olympic stadium, demolished after just four uses.
The ex-post analyzes of the South Korean Board of Audit and Inspection show how the local economic effects were significantly lower than the pre-event government estimates, confirming the tendency to systematically overestimate the impact on GDP and employment.
Milan-Cortina 2026: reduction of scale or repetition of the past?
Milan-Cortina 2026 differs from previous Winter Olympics due to its declared organizational model. The Government and the Organizing Committee have focused on an event a low infrastructural intensitybased largely on existing plants and on a wide territorial distribution between Lombardy, Veneto and Trentino-Alto Adige. A central element of the project is the formal separation between the budget of the Organizing Committee (OCOG) and that of the infrastructure works, financed through state and regional funds.
However, the main critical issues highlighted by the Center focus precisely on this distinction Court of Auditors. In the reports dedicated to Milan-Cortina 2026, the accounting judiciary underlined how the greatest financial risk does not concern the OCOG budget, relatively contained and supported by revenues partly already contracted with the International Olympic Committee, but rather the performance of the indirect costs. Traffic, safety, context works and environmental adjustments are the items most exposed to spending revisions and time slips.
Milano-Cortina 2026 is therefore played on a delicate balance. If the containment of indirect costs and compliance with deadlines are maintained, the event could represent a model of a less expensive Winter Olympics than in the past. Otherwise, the risk is that the overruns are concentrated precisely on the less visible expenses, reproducing – albeit on a smaller scale – the critical issues that have already emerged in previous editions hosted by Italy.
So, what do the data from the latest Winter Olympics say
The cross-case analysis shows three constants:
- Direct economic benefits rarely offset the public costs incurred
- Ex-ante estimates of the economic impact are inflated by between 200% and 400%
- The real return is predominantly intangible: reputation, political consensus, international visibility
L’OECD is clear in its judgment: mega-sporting events generate net economic benefits only under very restrictive conditions, which are difficult to replicate on a large scale.
Historical data clearly shows that the Winter Olympics are not, in themselves, an economic driver. The costs are immediate, concentrated and public; the benefits are uncertain, spread over time and often intangible. Confusing the symbolic impact with the economic return is one of the most recurring errors in the political debate.
The Winter Olympics can only become sustainable under three conditions: scale reductionintegration into territorial plans already financed and total transparency on ex-post costs. In the absence of these elements, the event remains above all an image operation, paid almost entirely by the public sector.
