Both reports released Friday agreed that the joint office for the V-22 program had failed to adequately assess and address growing security risks, despite the deaths of soldiers.
“Without improvements in the joint program to identify, analyze, and address osprey safety risks, program parties cannot adequately mitigate risks that may contribute to deaths, injuries, or loss of mission capability,” says the GAO report, which is very hard-line because the problems are long-standing.
Since 2022 alone, twenty soldiers have died in four tilt-rotor aircraft accidents. In four years there were twelve accidents of the highest category A. Seven of them involved mechanical failure of parts.
This is due to two main problems. One is the clutch, which slips in some modes and then suddenly engages hard, leading to a sharp increase in transmitted power. The second problem is with the gearbox and the differential which ensures that both rotors are turning at the same speed.
However, according to a US Navy report, it will take until 2034 for the problem to be finally resolved. The gearbox and clutch are being redesigned. Control reprogramming reduced but did not eliminate the risk, although crews were given new procedures for flipping the rotors.
The problems were not solved
He criticized the slow progress in resolving the problems in his NAVAIR report, which quoted the Defense One server as saying: “The accumulation of V-22 risks has been increasing since the first deployment. The program identified risks, however, due to limitations in technical solutions and funding priorities, did not promptly implement steps to correct and mitigate existing risks. As a result, risks continue to accumulate.”
One reason is that the 2001, 2009 and 2017 V-22 operational and safety evaluations “failed to establish accountability mechanisms.” This in turn has resulted in minimal implementation of steps to increase reliability and safety.
The GAO found that the average age of the 28 unresolved severe and moderate systemic risks was nine years, and 17 of them were not resolved within ten to fourteen years. While some issues have been resolved, more serious ones with dragons remain.
“Program stakeholders, which include the Osprey Joint Program Office and the military branches that operate the aircraft type (Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps), have completed 45 risk assessments but have not fully responded to 34 known systemic risks related to the potential failure of airframe and engine components,” the GAO report said. The fact that each of the three branches of the US armed forces has different security requirements is also to blame.
Between 2020 and 2024, only fifty percent of the V-22 machines in the Navy and sixty percent in the Marine Corps were to perform missions in a limited mode.
