A question of expected value, but also of model. To reduce uncertainty. In the United States – between the NFL and the NBA, between the NHL and the MLB – everyone has known for years, barring reforms that are very long in the making, how many and which teams play in the various leagues. The spectacularisation of sport generates more income, but this always remains within the same circuit: TV rights, victory bonuses, multi-season amortisation. Basically, all can be regularly planned from year to year. And they benefit, in a way that was also known at the start, the leading teams. Always the same, without any risk of losing the main stage due to relegation: this is one of the most significant differences compared to European football, which is finding it increasingly difficult to cope with the competition from the Americans.
In practice, to put it bluntly, American sports league teams are worth more than European ones. And they continue to increase in value. Two authoritative economic analyses, signed by, tell this in detail Financial Times and from Front Office Sports. According to these two publications, one of the main reasons for this gap is linked to the concept of sporting merit which has always distinguished the professional championships of the Old Continent. Investors look to stability, long-term growth and increased revenues: not even the pharaonic Premier League in Europe can compare with the closed model typical of American sport. And so, although more and more American entrepreneurs look to our football (but often within a multisport system, especially in England, combining the franchises of other disciplines) the overall turnover and the absolute flow of investments is completely unbalanced towards the USA.
He writes Front Office Sport: “In 2025, the record for the highest valuation of a professional sports franchise in a change-of-control transaction was broken twice in three months. And the same market dynamics remain in place, meaning valuations could rise again in 2026. The record was broken before with the sale of the Celtics at an initial valuation of $6.1 billion. Then, three months later, with the sale of the Lakers for a total valuation of ten billion. Also considering the sales of minority shares, the New York Giants exceeded ten billion dollars with the sale of a stake to the Koch family.” And again: «In 2025 the NBA, NFL, MLB and NHL franchises have outperformed most other asset classes over the last twenty years. The yield rose to 16.9%, outpacing nearly every other investment category except media and entertainment. The Celtics, Lakers and Trail Blazers were sold in 2025, all with valuations exceeding four billion dollars: figures that were unthinkable just ten years ago. The $2 billion deal for the Clippers in 2014 had already rewritten the market, but valuations continued to rise thanks to the new $77 billion media rights deal and the limited number of franchises.”
Here is the first point: the American sports market is small, very small. It’s a competitive environment where there is little margin for error. He explains it, even talking about relegations, the Financial Times. In the words of John Lambros, head of digital media and entertainment at Houlihan Lokey, an independent investment bank with a turnover of 1.8 billion dollars: «The organization of the leagues, the structure and the revenue sharing opportunities in the United States compared to the rest of the world are profoundly different. In most US sports, risk and volatility are lower. There is no risk of relegation and predictable media rights make revenues stable and easily estimable.” From here, according to the findings of Financial Timesa vicious circle is created that leads European football clubs to real stagnation: «The average business value of an NBA team has risen to 14.1 times revenues; in 2023 the share was 11.8 times. Average NFL team ratings have increased to 10.2 times revenue over the same period. The valuations of the main men’s football teams, concentrated in Europe, are stuck at only 4.2 times revenues.”
In this part of the world, however, there is a different tradition. And therefore there is a public opinion, understood as fans but also as a critical mass, which would never digest a system like the American one: the revolt against the Super League, which broke out practically five years ago after the attempted schism – by UEFA – of the top clubs of England, Spain and Italy was due precisely to the idea that the new competition had a limited number of players. And that it did not include a promotion-relegation mechanism. That model, however, seriously risks being swallowed up – at least from an economic point of view – by the American one. The numbers say it, some of the most prestigious economic newspapers in the world say it.
