(Adnkronos) – The Strait of Hormuz has been the jugular artery of the global energy economy for decades, but rarely as today does its centrality appear so fraught with structural risks. Not only because a decisive share of global energy passes through this narrow maritime corridor, but because the way in which the threat is exercised by the Iranian regime, perceived by the actors who depend on the possibility of crossing it freely, and managed by those involved in international security has changed.
Approximately 18–21 million barrels of oil pass through the Strait of Hormuz every day, equivalent to approximately 20-25% of global consumption, as well as a significant share of global trade in liquefied natural gas. Most of these flows are directed towards Asia: China, India, Japan and South Korea are critically dependent on the security of this passage.
Qatar, one of the world’s largest LNG exporters, uses Hormuz almost exclusively to reach international markets. Land-based alternatives exist, such as oil pipelines in Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, but their capacity remains limited and cannot compensate for a prolonged disruption to maritime traffic.
For this reason, any tension in the Strait is immediately reflected in the energy markets, on the insurance premiums of oil tankers and on the perception of global geopolitical risk.
In recent months, international attention has focused on strengthening Iranian military capabilities along the southern coast of the country, in particular in the province of Hormozgan and in the Bandar Abbas area, the main Iranian naval hub overlooking the Strait.
This is not a single demonstration move, but an integrated military system that includes anti-ship missiles with a range of up to 2,000 km and ballistic missiles with greater range and precision such as the Qassem Bassir (unveiled in May 2025), coastal air defense systems, drones deployable in a coordinated manner and light naval forces, including difficult-to-detect submarines. The IRGC Navy has introduced innovative platforms such as the Shahid Bagheri drone carrier and has recommissioned upgraded frigates such as the Sahand, equipped with enhanced air defenses. This military device not only serves for deterrence, but allows an asymmetric control of the sea capable of saturating adversary defenses. More sophisticated and better integrated capabilities than in the past.
The central point, in any case, is not the possibility of “closing” the Strait (a hypothesis that many analysts consider difficult to sustain in the long term) but rather the ability to make the threat of instability credible and constant.
During the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, the so-called “tanker war” saw attacks, naval mines and sabotage that affected merchant traffic. The risk was high, but military capabilities were limited and the dynamics relatively predictable.
Between 2011 and 2019, in response to international sanctions, Tehran threatened several times to block the Strait, resulting in ship seizures and targeted incidents. Even in that case, however, the Iranian strategy was above all political and symbolic, rather than based on stable operational control.
Today the difference is qualitative. A direct attack or formal closure is not necessary: the perception of a credible threat is enough to slow down maritime traffic, increase insurance costs, fuel volatility in energy prices and force Western chancelleries to react in real time. The precision of new missiles (such as the hypersonic Fattah) and the use of “loitering munitions” (kamikaze drones) make the concept of “front line” obsolete: every commercial ship is a potential static target within a radius of hundreds of kilometers.
Not just missiles: Iran has invested heavily in GPS spoofing (falsification of GPS signals) which induces merchant ships to enter Iranian waters “by mistake”, facilitating their legal seizure.
The main danger is not declared war, but accidental escalation. Oil tankers, merchant ships and military units from multiple countries pass through an extremely narrow maritime space every day. A downed drone, a misinterpreted radar signal or a maneuver considered hostile can trigger a chain reaction that is difficult to control.
The speed of modern military technologies reduces decision times and increases the risk of error. Added to this is the immediate amplification of every incident by the media and social networks, which transforms local episodes into international political crises, reducing the margins for silent diplomatic solutions.
Comparison with the past shows a substantial difference. If before the threat was episodic, today it appears structural. If in the past deterrence was based on symbolic gestures, it now relies on a complex and integrated military system.
The Strait of Hormuz remains open, but it is precisely this apparent normality that makes the risk more insidious: stability is no longer guaranteed by the absence of tensions, but by a fragile balance in which little is enough to move the needle of the balance.
