“I don’t like that. That’s not good,” said Donald Trump at the end of last year, referring to Ukraine. He didn’t mean the Russian bombs on residential areas in Ukraine. Rather, he was talking about an alleged attack by Ukraine on one of Putin’s residences. Trump said: “It’s one thing to be offensive. It’s another thing to attack your house. This is not the time for something like that.” He was very angry.
The American president was probably succumbed to a false claim by Russia. Ukraine has denied this attack, and American intelligence agencies have also concluded that it did not occur. But that aside, the question arises: Why shouldn’t the attacking country’s commander-in-chief be targeted? Isn’t that allowed?
In principle, Ukraine has the right to defend itself in the war of aggression waged by Russia on Russian territory. It can attack Russian forces and wartime infrastructure across Russia; she can also counterattack. She has already done all of this. The Ukrainians have also deliberately eliminated high-ranking officers on Russian territory. This is also permitted under international law of war. Not only the combatant at the front, but also the commander in the Moscow Defense Ministry is a legitimate military target.
The concern of the commanders in chief for their own safety
But what about the commander in chief? According to the Russian constitution, that is President Putin. The situation is actually clear: If all links in the chain of command can be attacked, this must also and especially apply to the commander in chief. If there were debates about this, it was primarily about the question of whether it was politically expedient to eliminate the leader of the enemy forces in a particular situation.
This is, above all, a strategic question: Is it possible that killing the enemy commander will cause more harm than good? Does such an action end the war – or prolong it? Perhaps the chaos after a targeted strike or a successor is worse than the previous ruler. An argument against such an attack can also be that a commander in chief does not want to set a precedent – also out of fear for his own safety. The reactions to the claims about an attack on Putin’s residence would fit this. Unlike at the beginning of the large-scale war, when there were credible reports of attempted assassinations of Zelensky, there is now the impression that eliminating the respective heads of state is not a direct aim of the war.
Concern about the possible repercussions was also behind the “Executive Order” of American President Gerald Ford in 1976, which banned targeted attacks on foreign heads of state in the name of the American government. However, this arrangement was later modified and reinterpreted. In 1986, President Ronald Reagan ordered airstrikes against a compound belonging to Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi, although the government denied that he himself was the target. And at the end of 1989, George Bush senior had Panama’s ruler, Manuel Noriega, forcibly kidnapped from his country. While in the first Gulf War the military’s attempt to directly attack the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein was rejected with the argument that this was not the way the USA waged war, things were different in the second Gulf War: It began with an attempt to eliminate Hussein directly, which, however, failed.
A question that was already asked in the 19th century
Of course, refraining from targeted strikes against foreign commanders was an internal commitment that American presidents imposed on their country. That didn’t mean that it was considered forbidden under international law. Even if the current American president gives a different impression: the US military traditionally attaches great importance to complying with international law. It deals with this intensively in its schools and in operations.
The question of attacks on military leaders was raised by Carl von Clausewitz at the beginning of the 19th century; However, he did not yet have heads of state in mind as commander-in-chief. If you consider that we now live in the age of targeted killings of opponents by drones without any spatial restrictions, it is usually not about interstate conflicts, but about eliminating suspected terrorist leaders.
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine is something different. Here Putin (like Zelensky) is at the top of the military chain of command. He is therefore a legitimate target under international law, even if he does not wear a uniform and does not go about his business from command posts but from residences. This also applies to the American president as commander-in-chief in an armed conflict. However, it has already been described as effectively “assassination-proof” because – unlike in the case of totalitarian rulers – other people and institutions are available.
But in addition to major actual hurdles, the decisive reason for the extensive protection of senior commanders in war is probably a cost-benefit calculation. The risks and uncertainties are considered to be too high. You know what to think of the current counterpart. And the outcome of the war will decide whether he gets away without sanctions.
