“If you don’t lead the game then you find yourself acting as a passenger for others.” Luciano Spalletti, perhaps the best aphorist in Serie A, summed up his Juventus’ defeat against Napoli in this way – which came amidst Maradona’s boos, ironically, exactly two years after he had been given honorary citizenship. Or at least, this was one of the ways he tried to explain a match in which Juventus managed to kick on target for the first time in the 59th minute – Yildiz’s momentary 1-1 goal.
“We have to make some conclusions,” said a nervous Spalletti at the end of the match, and of course there’s more. Juventus was coming off three consecutive victories, also considering the Champions League and the Italian Cup, but in the league, with yesterday’s defeat, they have only won one in the last four. At the moment they are eight points from the top and four from fourth place, with teams like Como and Bologna ahead of them. In the eight games with Spalletti on the bench, there were four victories, three draws and one defeat – yesterday’s, in fact.
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Spalletti responded a little badly to Andrea Marinozzi, on DAZN, who asked him if Juventus had a problem defending the far post. He responded almost offendedly to those who asked him in the press conference if Yildiz had been out due to a physical problem: “He has to do more, and then I can’t let Openda who was paid 50 million play for a quarter of an hour?” (to be precise, Juventus has paid around four million for now, with the remaining 40.6 to be paid at the end of this season in case it finishes in the top ten places in the rankings, at least according to what Fabrizio Romano reports).
There were some strong choices on his part, of course, but he doesn’t seem to think they were decisive. Without Vlahovic, Spalletti preferred to play with Yildiz and Conceição as an attacking pair, switching to 5-3-2 to gain superiority in midfield. As he confirmed post-match, he thought he could dribble with his three midfielders (and the two attacking midfielders disguised as strikers) against Napoli’s two midfielders – one of whom, moreover, was Elmas, adapted by Conte in the emergency of injuries in midfield.
According to him, he wanted to bring out one of Napoli’s three defenders and then go and play in the space that had become free. This was not the case: Juventus not only failed to dribble but also Conte’s three central defenders had an easy time attacking Yildiz and Conceicao with their backs to the goal. Spalletti then said that he had taken away “the curiosity” of those who asked to see Yildiz in a central position, as if he had been forced.
But first of all his strategy didn’t work: Conte’s three central defenders were never put in difficulty by the midfielders and even when Juventus had the extra man in midfield they were unable to dribble.
An example:
Juventus possession with Napoli making an average block. Beukema initially goes up on Thuram but Koopmeiners carries the ball towards the right. Elmas leaves Locatelli for a moment to screen Yildiz but Cabal and Kalulu are very slow in getting him the ball and Elmas has time to return to pressure, which is rather light. The free man would be Thuram in the center but Locatelli would have to turn on his weak foot, and instead prefers to insist on the right, giving the ball to McKennie on the sideline, with McTominay on him who will end up taking the ball away from him.
On the other hand, this system guaranteed Napoli defensive superiority, with the three defenders against the two attackers. To equalize under pressure, Juventus had to raise one of Thuram or McKennie, asking Locatelli to climb onto the free midfielder, with one of Yildiz or Coinceção climbing to screen the pass from the defence.
A system that was not only tiring, which often did not work, allowing Elmas to receive with ease, but which forced the Juventus wingers to make a decisive choice each time: go to the corresponding winger and, consequently, leave the three defenders in numerical parity with the three Napoli attackers, or remain in coverage and concede the field.
On the occasion of Hojlund’s goal, for example, Cabal remains in the middle ground, he cannot decide whether to attack Di Lorenzo or cover the depth and in the end he does neither. Neres had time to fake the shot and go back for the first time, before attacking the space behind Cabal and being served by Di Lorenzo. At that point, for Koopemeiners, defending in the open field against Neres who can return on the left foot is a nightmare. As well as for Kelly who has to play one-on-one with Hojlund near the small area.
Neres goes on the right, in theory the least dangerous choice for Juventus, and Kelly covers the space in front of Hojlund, in theory the right one to intercept a low and tense cross. But Neres’ ball is very precise and Hojlund moves Kelly enough using his body to pass in front of him.
The first half made it clear that a Locatelli-McKennie-Khephren Thuram midfield is incapable of dribbling. This could have been imagined taking into account individual characteristics – a defensive playmaker who drops a lot; an insertion midfielder and a leading midfielder – but in case this too was a curiosity to be solved, Spalletti removed it.
The transition to 3-4-2-1 (with McKennie outside on the right, Cambiaso on the left and Cabal replaced with David) in the second half meant giving up possession ambitions, it’s true, but it had the merit of helping Juventus’ pressing. Playing mirror-like, Napoli resorted more to direct balls towards the attackers, especially towards Hojlund – with that typical mechanism they count which involves the passage towards the sideline (usually to a midfielder, in this case exploiting, in addition to Di Lorenzo and Oliveira, also the widening of Beukema and Buongiorno) and then towards the inside.
The more vertical Napoli did not take any risks in the build-up (Juventus, however, did not recover any ball in the final third of the pitch, nor make any tackles) but they lost the control they had in the first half, playing more on duels, as is the norm for their best men.
However, Juventus also seems more comfortable in a vertical and duel context and regained the game by taking advantage of a ball recovered in mid-field and played quickly forward.
And David’s tactical influence in the situation of Yildiz’s goal must be underlined, the way in which he pushes Napoli’s defense down and keeps the central defenders busy by creating the space where the number 10 fits in: first Buongiorno stays close to Rrahmani so as not to leave him in a one-on-one situation, with McKennie overlapping behind Oliveira, engaged by Conceição; then Rrahmani himself cannot close the space into which Yildiz enters so as not to leave him alone.
In short, the presence of a center forward created far greater benefits than what was thought could be achieved with the bizarre module of the first half. Spalletti had given up numerical parity in attack for superiority in midfield and – this was the response from the pitch – it was the wrong choice.
But then Spalletti returned to it. Perhaps to try to control the result, satisfied with the draw, or perhaps out of sheer stubbornness, a quarter of an hour later he put the initial 5-3-2 back on the pitch. He removed Yildiz and Conceição from the field for Miretti (entered to act as midfielder on the right) and Openda (to support David).
Immediate consequence: Juventus lowered their center of gravity and forced Napoli to play calmly in their own half of the pitch. Then the goal arose from a fortuitous situation, a cross blocked by McKennie at the far post, who instead of deflecting the ball out of the area put it on Hojlund’s head, but the context was one in which Juventus had once again had the same structural disadvantage as in the first half.
Miretti, fresh, puts pressure on Buongiorno, as in the first half, but behind him Locatelli doesn’t even think about shortening on McTominay, who thus receives and brings the ball into the Juventus half of the pitch. This happened a minute before Hojlund’s second goal.
Spalletti spoke of «behaviors», «shyness», of lost balls. It seems that for him, Juventus’s eventual leap depends only on the players in the squad, and that they are the ones who need to improve. But isn’t it the coach’s job to put them in the best conditions possible?
When he said he had removed Yildiz for Openda he omitted to talk about the second change of module – that is, he also omitted to have removed him to bring in Miretti. Why did he go back to 5-3-2? And above all: did it work? The short answer is no.
And he declared it, albeit indirectly, himself, changing again, when it was too late, less than ten minutes from the end, putting Zhegrova on the field for Thuram (another player who seemed above all out of context, rather than shy) and returning to the 3-4-2-1 – thus obtaining a final opportunity. For what Juventus did, however, a draw would have been too much, if we want to see the match like a boxing match, deciding who wins on points.
Spalletti was nervous at the end of the match and it can’t be easy to give an immediate account of a defeat, to answer questions that perhaps, in his opinion, don’t get to the point of the matter. With his staff, Spalletti works every day to improve the team, to get to know it better, and it is right to give him time and have trust, as well as respect, for his choices. But sometimes an external point of view can be useful and this time, seen from the outside, the main factor that complicated life at Juventus was himself with his choices.
