Herr Johansson, es ist fast vier Jahre her, dass Russland die Ukraine überfallen hat. Damals hat Europa versprochen, mehr in seine Verteidigung zu investieren. Wie weit sind wir bislang gekommen?
We have built up our deterrence capability and better filled the ammunition depots. But there is still a long way to go. We need better missile defense systems and must shift the focus even more from classic systems such as tanks and guided missiles to new technologies. Different countries are taking the urgency away The truth is very different. Less is being done in southwestern and southeastern Europe. Others are really ramping up their production – I’m thinking of the countries in Scandinavia and the Baltics, Poland and Germany.
Many people think that armament progress is still too slow – including the German Defense Minister, who criticizes the industry for this. Does he have a point?
The industry is used to having a lot of time and little money. We have to manage in a more decentralized way in order to grow. I tell my employees: Go out there and take risks. If you fail, okay, learn from it and try again. There needs to be a cultural shift so that speed is the most important thing. This applies to the entire system. The employees in the armed forces and procurement offices are also used to completely different processes. Breaking down these structures and really speeding things up is quite difficult.
What would have to happen so that new technologies could be introduced to the troops more quickly?
For drones, for example, it would make sense to forego a comprehensive and “perfect” capability definition, as is currently the case at the beginning of the procurement process. Instead, several companies could compete in parallel and demonstrate their skills in stages. Then the armed forces will get something that they can use much more quickly. To do this, we need more proximity between the military and industry so that end users are involved in development. Such proximity was once considered problematic, but Ukraine has shown that it is necessary for modern capabilities.
They are talking to the Swedish Ministry of Defense about new procurement channels for drones. What would that look like in practice?
The state would pay a monthly fee for our willingness to ramp up production at the push of a button. That would be essentially a subscription for drones. We would also commit to continually modernizing the technology. The troops first get something that is “good enough,” if you will, and then we gradually develop the product further, like an iPhone. This can affect software, but also new sensors or weapons. This would allow the armed forces to actually practice with the drones and develop operational concepts.
Saab generates around 40 percent of its sales in Sweden. How important is the German market for you?
For us, Germany is a key country in Europe. We have been a proud partner of the German armed forces for more than 40 years, have production facilities there and work closely with companies like Diehl Defense. We want to continue to grow in Germany. However, competition from the German arms industry is strong, and the German army procures a lot domestically. For Saab this means: We have to be even more present on site and transfer technology, build skills, create jobs and so on.
Another opportunity could arise if France and Germany abandon the FCAS project and do not develop a joint fighter jet. Would Saab be available as a partner for Airbus Defense?
Saab definitely has the necessary skills. This is precisely why we look forward to possible collaborations with confidence; we are not dependent on a partner. However, we don’t close any doors. We are ready for a joint fighter jet with the Germans – if there is a clear political commitment from both governments. The prerequisite is that we can continue to build combat aircraft systems independently and not hand over half of these skills to another company. I’m sure that people in Germany see it similarly: Cooperation shouldn’t mean that people become completely dependent on each other.
Isn’t that exactly a problem with previous projects – that countries claim leadership and seal off their own technology?
It’s not about using technology in a protectionist manner, but rather transparently. Who brings in which skills would have to be clearly based on where Saab and Airbus Defense have their strengths – everyone contributes what they are good at. If both companies have access to this knowledge, then both retain their full capabilities.
How quickly could a project like this progress?
We would certainly need ten years to develop a fully-fledged new fighter aircraft, and we would probably be ready for operational deployment by the end of the 2030s. The first step for collaboration should be an unmanned capability, here we are talking about four to five years until delivery. I think this capability is extremely important to complement Saab’s Gripen jet and the Eurofighter in the future. We are already in discussions with Airbus Defense about this.
How far are these discussions?
We have developed concepts and an idea of what capabilities such a system should have. But so far this is more of the preparatory work to convince our governments of the project. It would be good if Germany and Sweden moved forward together. But a clear political commitment is still missing.
Is it better if such a project starts with industrial cooperation – and not political will?
It can work both ways. But it cannot be the case that politicians decide to cooperate while companies have no interest in it because they see themselves too much as competitors or are not prepared to share technology with each other. This difficulty is already eliminated if the project originates from the industry.
Saab is already carrying out a study on the next generation of fighter aircraft on behalf of Sweden. How likely is it that this will become a program?
There will definitely be a program that comes out of this study. It may well be that we continue as before – with many partner companies, but under Swedish management. Then we would have our own FCAS program. Or we can join forces with another country and create a larger market, although Sweden will still have to maintain its technological independence, as I said. I assume that Sweden will take one of these paths in 2028, or at the latest in 2030.
In other words: If Germany wants to join forces with Sweden, it should decide quickly.
If Germany wants to push this forward, yes, absolutely.
Saab developed its first fighter aircraft in 1937 because the Americans suddenly preferred to keep their aircraft themselves. How reliable is the American partner today?
In its new National Security Strategy, the USA has reiterated that Europe must become more sovereign. From 2027 we should take responsibility for the NATO pillar in Europe ourselves. This gives us a clear time frame that shows: Europe must hurry up. In my view, this also includes a different procurement strategy. We are far too dependent on America. We cannot say on the one hand that we are taking more responsibility and on the other hand buy everything in the USA. That contradicts itself.
However, the engine of your Gripen jet also comes from the USA. Trump could even influence which countries you export your aircraft to. Why don’t you secure yourself with another European supplier?
I’m confident in the fact that it’s good for the US if we sell the Gripen – at least it’s the next best thing for them if they don’t win the competition themselves. And US export policy is no more restrictive than Sweden’s. This is currently the cheapest solution for the Gripen. Installing a different engine in a fighter aircraft would be a huge effort and certainly not a cost-effective approach.
Saab produces the rear part of the Air Force’s training aircraft for Boeing. Does this interdependence provide some security?
Like all locations of foreign defense companies, our American subsidiary is also subject to a special security agreement. The Saab Group’s influence on this company is therefore limited. There is a certain degree of mutual dependence; after all, we have an influence on production. But I can’t imagine a scenario where we use it. Basically, you raise an important point: We often talk about how dependent we are on the USA, but America’s defense industry also needs Europe; we supply components for their systems. It is often said that the USA can do everything – but in reality that is not the case.
Where is Europe’s defense industry ahead of the USA?
There are areas where we are at least on equal terms. We have excellent missile and sensor technology in Europe and excellent electronic warfare capabilities. We are very good at building ships and submarines and have an airborne early warning capability that the Americans do not currently produce in this form. I think we underestimate the European defense industry.
Why don’t we in Europe manage to play these cards?
We run the risk of just putting all the money into domestic industries. In this way we would simply raise fragmentation to a higher level instead of truly pooling our strengths. Instead, we should set up large lighthouse projects on which three or four countries work together. A good example is the guided missile manufacturer MBDA. We could work together much more closely – especially when it comes to ammunition, sensors and unmanned capabilities. Such a coalition of the willing is crucial in order to be globally competitive and at the same time have enough staying power in the event of war.
