The SIC’s sanction against five football clubs and Dimayor not only punishes an anti-competitive agreement: it exposes the cracks in a transfer system marked by informal practices and weak governance that for years has allowed arrangements outside the regulation.
By: Camilo Ubaque Calixto
The sanction imposed by the Superintendency of Industry and Commerce (SIC) last October, on Dimayor and some Colombian football clubs, opens a question that transcends the figures of the fines: what does this case reveal about the way in which the transfer market is organized and about the governance of professional football in Colombia? What consequences does it have? The discussion is key because the patterns identified by the SIC not only compromise free competition, but also show how certain informal practices have shaped the internal functioning of the sport for years. Its effects range from the labor rights of footballers to the way clubs negotiate, compete and assemble their squads.
Although football is a sporting spectacle, it also functions as a highly competitive labor market. FIFA, in its Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Playersestablishes that each club must act independently, without agreements that limit the hiring of footballers or the mobility of talent. In Colombia, this system is articulated through three pieces: the employment contract, the transfer agreements and the transfer windows. When a contract expires or a player terminates it for just cause, he becomes a “free player” and can sign with any team, a principle that guarantees mobility, competitive salaries and freedom of negotiation. Acolfutproan organization that was born to defend the rights of players, has insisted that this mobility is essential to balance power between clubs and workers, especially in a market where sports rights function as a tradable economic asset.
The sanction by the SIC against Dimayor and several Colombian football clubs does not come out of nowhere. In Colombia, different players and unions have denounced for years the existence of a “gentlemen’s agreement”, an unwritten agreement between managers to veto or stop the hiring of footballers who left a club “badly” or who terminated their contract early. Similar practices were investigated in Mexico, where the Federal Economic Competition Commission sanctioned Liga MX clubs for so-called “no-poach agreements”, and FIFA itself has questioned informal mechanisms that limit the contractual freedom of players. These pacts, which operate in the shadows, reduce the bargaining power of players and generate opacity, allowing key market decisions to depend more on private agreements than on official rules.
The SIC resolution fits precisely into that context: an ecosystem where informal practices have been more decisive than the rules, and where the intervention of an external authority becomes necessary to protect transparency and competition in Colombian professional football.
The Superintendency of Industry and Commerce (SIC) determined that five professional soccer clubs (Deportivo Boyacá Chicó Fútbol Club SA, Unión Magdalena SA, Asociación Deportivo Pasto, Envigado Fútbol Club SA and Club Deportivo Atlético Fútbol Club SA), as well as the Major Division of Colombian Soccer (Dimayor), conceived a system that limited free economic competition.
The “gentlemen’s agreement” and its impact on footballers
The action of the Superintendence of Industry and Commerce (SIC) in this case was diligent, as it was a need that had been demanded for many years at the base of the union, however, the political power that exists in many clubs had always weighed. This time, the investigation was activated by the formal complaint presented by the Colombian Association of Professional Soccer Players (Acolfutpro). This players’ union alerted the authority in 2021 about the formation of the so-called “black lists” and vetoes that restrict the free negotiation of athletes. Thus, just in October 2024, the Superintendency dismantled the so-called no-poach agreements, also known as a “gentleman’s agreement”, converting the players’ claim into a historic sanction, showing that the competition law did work to protect labor dignity in Colombian football.
Dimayor’s resistance to the institutional control of the SIC was reflected in its attempt to stop cartelization charges through judicial means. In fact, that same organization went to the highest courts to try to escape the sanction, arguing that due process had been violated. However, the Supreme Court of Justice ruled against him, ratified the authority of the Superintendency and indicated that the action did not meet the requirement of immediacy, having been filed late. This desperate attempt not only confirmed the validity of the fine, but also exposed Dimayor’s unwillingness to submit to the Colombian legal framework.
Thus, the sanction imposed by the SIC revealed the precise mechanics of the “gentlemen’s agreement”, an anti-competitive system that operated as a coercive mechanism that lasted over time, designed to control the labor market of soccer players. This was not an informal agreement between two or three clubs, but a coordinated strategy that limited the player’s free mobility in the domestic market. The system materialized through three patterns of behavior that, when united, create a barrier for the footballer who would like to negotiate freely without the yoke of businessmen:
Exchange of sensitive information: The initial and most damaging action was the systematic exchange of labor information between clubs (with Dimayor’s knowledge) about specific players. This was not public information, but confidential data that should only be handled by the employing club. What did they share? Details on whether a player had requested unilateral termination of his contract, for example for non-payment; if he had been charged with an alleged disciplinary offense or if the club denied his status as a free agent. To understand a little more, suppose that a player requested to terminate his contract with Unión Magdalena SA (sanctioned club) arguing non-payment. Immediately, the club sent a communication to the entire league informing that it refuses the termination and warning about the legal and contractual situation of the footballer.
Union pressure: To hide what they were doing, the clubs did not issue orders but rather appealed to a union code of honor. Terms such as “gentlemen’s agreement”, “ethical call” or “guild solidarity” were used in the communications. These phrases were veiled threats that sent a clear message to any club interested in the player: “If you hire him, you are violating solidarity and we could do the same to you in the future.” The club that received the alert understood that, beyond the legality of the negotiation, signing that player meant antagonizing the group of directors.
The participation of the Dimayor: The SIC also discovered that the Dimayor as an association was fundamental for the anti-rights against soccer players to materialize. By being aware of these messages and, in some cases, by circulating these communications itself, the Dimayor institutionally legitimized the veto. The SIC noted that this reinforced the idea that the veto action was “supported” by the leadership, making it even more difficult for a club to opt out of anti-competitive conduct.
This practice translated into a severe limitation of professional mobility: a player in conflict with his club (like those involved in the case) was effectively banned, since no Colombian team would risk hiring him so as not to break with “union solidarity”, forcing him into unemployment or looking for minor leagues. Furthermore, the player lost all his bargaining power, resulting in salary suppression: since there was no competition for his talent, the clubs knew that they could offer a very low salary or simply not offer anything. Finally, the system meant a violation of labor dignity, since it forced the footballer to submit to the informal rule of the managers, going from being a worker with rights to being treated as property whose fate depended on the coordinated will of the club owners, instead of the law or the mechanisms of FIFA.
The sanction to Dimayor and the clubs for the “gentlemen’s agreement” is perhaps the strongest evidence of the institutional fragility that permeates the leadership of Colombian football. The intervention of the SIC is not an accident, but a necessity generated by the inability of the union itself to self-regulate. The case shows that Dimayor, as a governing body, has historically operated with a fairly marked asymmetry of power in favor of the managers and against the players. By participating in sending communications that banned soccer players, the union ended up transforming an informal practice into a kind of “norm.” This reveals a dangerous dependence on informal agreements that take priority over Colombian labor legislation and FIFA’s own statutes.
This scenario not only points to a lack of controls, but also to a phenomenon of “regulatory capture.” Dimayor failed to implement effective internal controls, in part because its very structure was instrumentalized by the economic interests of its members. Their role, instead of being the guarantor of a more or less transparent market, ended up becoming the facilitator of a de facto monopoly on talent.
For this reason, the sanction and fine of the SIC for 8,000 billion pesos, against Dimayor and the clubs, is exemplary because more than an economic punishment, the decision marks the primacy of Competition Law over sports self-regulation. This forces the leadership to reevaluate its model: the footballer is, above all, a worker whose value must be determined by competition and not by veto.
Transparency note: This content has a guideline. We point out funding for transparency with our audiences; Financial support does not interfere with our analysis of free competition, the labor rights of soccer players, or the governance of professional soccer in Colombia.
