ANFP-FIFA Dispute: Chilean Football’s Legal Battle

The author of this written column for Ciper comments on the FIFA and Conmebol reaction to the reform of the Professional Sports Corporation Law that is discussed today in Congress. He maintains that this project is consistent with other laws in the world and that “the future of Chilean football, its integrity and its ability to develop talent, depend on the adoption of transparency, accountability and a clear separation of powers between the professional league and the National Federation.”

Cover image: Diego Martín / Agency One

Chilean professional football is, once again, in the center of a contentious debate. Senator Matías Walker promotes a reform to the Professional Sports Societies Law (SADP Law) to eradicate conflicts of interest that affect sport. This initiative has caused an energetic response from FIFA and Conmebol, who, in a letter to the ANFP, expressed their “concern” for a possible “undue interference” of the Chilean State in the organization and governance of the Football Federation of Chile (FFCH). Pablo Milad, president of the ANFP and the FFCH, has amplified these warnings, suggesting serious sanctions such as the exclusion of international tournaments and the loss of funds.

This analysis argues that the ANFP narrative about an alleged “undue interference” is a “smoke curtain” to safeguard entrenched political and economic interests, and delay crucial reforms that seek transparency. The legislative proposal, far from being an illegitimate intervention, is aligned with international best practices in sports governance. Senator Walker has affirmed that Milad «Badly informed FIFA«, Suggesting a deliberate representation of the situation. The invocation of the “FIFA ghost” has been a recurring strategy in Chilean football, as in 2012, without materializing alleged threats. This persistence suggests a deep interest in preserving the current financial power and opacity, even if it implies distorting the nature of the legislative proposal.

Law No. 20.019, promulgated in 2005transformed Chilean sports clubs into professional sports corporations (SADP). Although it sought to regulate sports, its dispositions on conflicts of interest were “extremely limited and easy to violate”, limiting itself to preventing a shareholder from possessing more than 5% of actions in more than one SADP that competed in the same activity and sports category.

Key modifications include: prohibit the same person or entity from controlling two or more sports organizations or is related to another; expand the scope of the prohibition of article 21; include foundations and corporations in regulation; propose sanctions such as loss of decision -making capacity; demand a record of representatives of athletes and prohibit them from being controllers of sports organizations; and establish the obligation to publish annual transactions.

A crucial aspect of the reformbacked by Senator Walker and Sports Minister Jaime Pizarro, It is the separation of the ANFP FFCH. Currently, the FFCH is “absorbed” in the ANFP, which responds to the Council of Presidents (Clubs, SADP) prioritizing its own interests. This separation would allow the FFCH to focus on the integral development of football (amateur, female, youth) and access public resources, while the ANFP would exclusively manage the professional leagues. The law proposes a transition period, possibly two years, to adapt contracts such as television rights.

The legislative proposal is a comprehensive review to close legal gaps that have allowed opaque practices and selfish behaviors. The ANFP resistance is explained by the direct threat that these definitions represent for existing arrangements and concentrations of power. The current interted structure, where the ANFP controls the FFCH, generates a systemic conflict of interest, allowing the economic interests of the clubs to dictate the national football policy. The opposition of the ANFP to separation is not a general “interference”, but the loss of direct control over the broader football ecosystem, including the income of the national team and development funds, which are currently managed by an entity subject to professional clubs. This structural change represents a significant threat to the centralized power of the ANFP.

The statutes of FIFA and Conmebol emphasize the independence of their federations member of the «Improper interference«. FIFA declares “neutral in policy and religion” and demands “A democratic electoral procedure«.

FIFA and Conmebol have sanctioned federations by state interference in the past, but it is crucial to distinguish the nature of these interventions:

• El Salvador (2022): The Government tried to dismiss executives and appoint interim to adapt statutes to a government law.
• India (2022): The Federation was suspended by “undue influence of third parties”, specifically a committee of administrators appointed by a court that assumed control.
• Kuwait (2015): The Federation was suspended by government interference in a “sports law” that affected its autonomy.
• Clubs (Santos, Sevilla, Sint-Truidense, Twente): Fines and warnings for allowing “third parties to be in the independence of the club on issues related to hiring and transfers.”

These precedents show that FIFA acts when a government intervenes directly to remove or appoint officials, or dictate the leadership structure of a federation. In contrast, the Chilean Law Proposal It seeks to establish a regulatory framework to prevent conflicts of interest and ensure transparency, do not appoint or remove officials.

Senator Walker has affirmed that “no indication of this project constitutes interference in the terms of its statutes; On the contrary, it ends with the conflicts of interest, in the terms that the highest agency has led ». The law is concentrated in improving transparency and good government, objectives that are aligned with the declared goals of FIFA. The Spanish case, where a similar separation between the Royal Spanish Football Federation (RFEF) and LaLiga was implemented in 2023 without FIFA objections, reinforces this argument. There is a possible contradiction in FIFA position, which advocates good governance but resists national legislative efforts that challenge existing power structures. This allows national federations to use the autonomy of FIFA as a shield against legitimate reforms.

The ANFP controls substantial income, mainly from television rights. In 2020, the Soccer Channel (TNT Sports) contributed about 83 million dollars to the ANFP. In 2024, the ANFP distributed more than 80 billion Chilean pesos to professional clubs for these rights these funds are vital for clubs, covering wages and operations. The distribution model does not reward sports merit equally.

The lack of transparency of the ANFP in the publication of its financial statements Since 2020 or 2021 it is “suspicious” and is linked to the desire to preserve its “power preserves”- this opacity generates questions about fund management and entails a loss of credibility and trust. The resistance to the separation of the FFCH and the ANFP, and the emphasis on “interference”, are rooted in the ANFP desire to maintain financial and operational control over the entire Chilean football ecosystem. Dilatory tactics are a direct defense of a lucrative the status quo that benefits a select group of professional clubs and its leaders, possibly at the expense of transparency and equitable development.

The ANFP, under Pablo Milad, has actively used the warnings of FIFA and Conmebol as a strategic tool. Milad “informed FIFA” about the project and then “justified” the subsequent letter, insisting that the legislation could be seen as “interference.” This action has been described as a «Last minute desperate maneuver»To stop a law that threatens the the status quo,

Milad’s argument, which argues that the law intervenes in “decisions of a federation, which is a private non -profit corporation” and limits “suitable persons” to preside over the FFCH, contrasts with the true nature of the project. Senator Walker and other promoters of the law argue that the proposal respects the FIFA statutes and follows successful international models. The law seeks to end conflicts of interest, not dictating who governs, but as Governance is exercised to ensure probity. The Spanish case of the separation between the RFEF and LaLiga, without FIFA objections, is a key counterexample.

Milad’s statement that the FFCH is a “private non -profit corporation” implies that it should be immune to legislative supervision. However, “ «. The ANFP resistance is an attempt to maintain a self -regulation status that is not subject to the same level of scrutiny as other industries with significant public impact.

The current structure, where the FFCH is “absorbed” in the ANFP, leads to professional clubs prioritizing their financial interests on the integral development of sport. The lack of transparency in the finances of the ANFP aggravates this situation, generating questions about the allocation of funds. This perpetuates a system full of conflicts of interest, where the actions of the ANFP, promoted by self -preservation and the protection of “privileges”, not only hinder the reform, but rather undermine integrity and public trust in Chilean football.